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Introduction
International negotiations on climate change are now in the process of intensive search for a post-Kyoto protocol. The current situation is quite different from the 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed upon by most industrialized countries. One important change is that China has meanwhile out-dated the US as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Also the growing emissions of developing countries necessitate the inclusion of these countries in a post-Kyoto protocol if such an agreement shall be effective.
In particular developing countries have a vivid interest in combating global warming because it is especially their economies that will be negatively affected by climate change. Furthermore, there were significant extra benefits additional to slowing global warming which these countries could obtain if they actively contributed to climate protection. In this respect Aunan et al. (2007: 472) argue that a climate protection commitment would provide significant ancillary benefits to China 1 since climate protection efforts will not only cause a reduction in GHG emissions but also reductions in particles-and NO X -emissions. These (and other) non-GHG-emission reductions -in turn -will improve public health and will increase agricultural yields. Smith and Haigler (2008) recently offered sample calculations which illustrate the highdegree of ancillary benefit effectiveness for interventions in the household energy sector in developing countries. Further studies on ancillary benefits in the developing world are provided by, e.g. van Vuuren et al. (2003) , Vennemo et al. (2006) for 1 Ancillary benefits are benefits generated by climate policy, but are not derived from the slowing of climate change. Other terms which convey this idea are secondary benefits, cobenefits and spillover benefits (see IPCC (2001) ). The main difference between the terms is the relative emphasis given to benefits derived from slowing climate change versus other benefits. The types of impacts being covered are the same under each of these labels (Markandya and Rübbelke (2004: 489) ).
China, Dessus and O'Connor (2003) for Chile and Bussolo and O'Connor (2001) for India.
Although considered to be of less importance than in developing countries, ancillary benefits in industrialized countries may also be significant. Several studies found that ancillary benefits may even represent a multiple of primary benefits, i.e. the benefits derived from the slowing of climate change, 2 as Pearce (2000: 523) illustrates in an overview. The compilation of ancillary benefit assessments for the US provided by Pearce (2000: 523) shows that ancillary benefits are a multiple of primary benefits, in the range between 0.07 and 6.67 (for European studies the range is between 0.98 (UK) and 6.93 (Germany) ). An overview of further US studies is provided by Burtraw et al. (2003: 650-673) .
As Ekins (1996a Ekins ( : 163, 1996b illustrates the inclusion of ancillary benefits in costbenefit analyses will cause a rise in optimal climate policy levels. Beyond the quantitative effect of ancillary benefits, there is also a qualitative dimension. Whereas the primary benefits of climate policy can be enjoyed globally, the ancillary benefits can only be enjoyed on a local or regional scale (IPCC (1996: 217) ). 3 In other words, climate protection generated by climate policy is a global public good, while the ancillary effects are mainly a private good from the climate policy providing country's or region's point of view.
2 Rübbelke (2002: 5-23) provides an extensive distinction between primary and ancillary benefits. Furthermore, in contrast to primary benefit, ancillary benefits arise almost immediately after the climate protection measure has been accomplished. Krupnick, Burtraw and Markandya (2000: 55) note: "we feel the heart of the analysis of ancillary benefits involves the here and now that is relevant to individual policy makers in a national context."
Already Musgrave (1959: 13) stressed: "Certain public wants may fall on the border line between private and social wants, where the exclusion principle can be applied to part of the benefits gained but not to all." Because of the joint-production property of climate policy and the fact that the jointly generated outputs are partly private to individual countries or regions and partly public to the whole world, climate policy is a so-called impure public good (see Cornes and Sandler (1996: 542) ). It is important to note that the join-production property which we consider, i.e. implying that one strategy has two effects (a private and a public), differs from the analyses of mitigation versus adaptation (e.g. Barrett (2008) ) or joint supply of climate mitigation and R&D on new abatement technologies (e.g. Barrett (2006) ), implying two strategies and two effects.
In recent years, the impure public good case also raised much attention in the theoretical oriented literature. Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1998 applies the basic approach developed by Cornes and Sandler (1984) to the field of philanthropy. Cornes and Sandler (1994) demonstrate that substitutability and complementarity of the private and public good lead to quite different comparative static results. Comparative static analyses based on the model by Cornes and Sandler (1994) are also conducted by Rübbelke (2003) who investigates climate policy as well as by Kotchen (2005) who considers environmentally friendly consumption. Rübbelke (2003) includes an alternative technology producing the impure public good's private characteristic independently of the public characteristic, while Kotchen (2005) allows for both, an independent production of the private as well as of the public characteristic.
In his analysis of green markets Kotchen (2006) also considers alternative technologies producing the impure public good's characteristics. He finds the surprising result that green technologies can be either welfare-improving or immiserizing, although they expand the consumer's choice possibilities and augment the production options. Kotchen and Moore (2007) employ the impure public good approach to the analysis of household participation in green-electricity programs. Dubin and Navarro (1988) address household refuse collection in an impure public good setting and Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) analyze agricultural research. Sandler and Murdoch (1990) provide an interesting study with a system of demand equations for pure and impure public good problems, distinguishing between NashCournot and Lindahl behaviour. They illustrate their technique with estimating military expenditure equations for a sample of ten NATO allies. They find that NashCournot, rather than Lindahl behaviour, best characterizes allies' behaviour. More importantly, they find that the impure public good specification provides a better fit than the pure public good specification of their model.
The impure public good property has not only distributional consequences, i.e.
concerning who is enjoying the benefits, but has also consequences for the good's production prospects. "This follows because the jointly produced private output can serve a privatising role, not unlike the establishment of property rights" (Cornes and Sandler (1984: 595) ). Nevertheless, impure public good provision tends to be suboptimal low because of the good's public characteristic (and despite its jointly generated private characteristic) and the associated free-rider incentives.
More specifically: on the one hand, ancillary benefits will call for higher globally optimal abatement levels. On the other hand, this will also be the case in the noncooperative equilibrium. For individual countries it is no longer irrelevant where the climate policy is accomplished. If a country does not contribute to climate protection, it will not enjoy ancillary benefits, though it can still benefit from the global benefits.
Due to the impure public good nature of climate policy, international coordination is still needed. However, there is no global coercive authority which can enforce efficient global climate protection and consequently, countries have to voluntarily negotiate and agree upon such coordination.
It is therefore important to ascertain not only the largely undisputed quantitative and qualitative impacts of ancillary benefits for climate policy levels, but also their strategic implications. Recently, by using normal form games, Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) investigated the outcome of international negotiations on climate change in two different scenarios: one with and one without the inclusion of ancillary benefits. They find that if international negotiations are represented as a chicken game, ancillary benefits tend to have a positive influence on the propensity of countries to participate in an international agreement on climate change.
In this paper, we will investigate this idea further. We depart from the simple bimatrix games used in Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) and analyze the effects of ancillary benefits in the strategic setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. We consider three model versions, which have been considered in the literature. We reach quite different and mostly negative conclusions. The driving forces are different in the three models. In the first model, ancillary benefits lead to smaller coalition as they reduce the threshold of countries necessary for an agreement to be profitable. In the other two models, ancillary benefits increase not only abatement and payoffs of coalition members but also of outsiders, which leaves the free-rider incentives mainly unchanged.
In the following, we develop our framework, analyze the size of stable coalitions and evaluate the success of coalition formation in welfare terms for three models in section 2. Finally, we summarize our main findings in section 3 and point to possible future research issues.
The Model

Introduction
We consider the two-stage cartel formation game with N countries -which can be regarded as the working horse in the analysis of international environmental agreements since Barrett (1994) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992) . q . We assume countries to be ex-ante symmetric, i.e. all have the same payoff function, but depending on whether they are signatories or non-signatories they 4 A survey is provided in Finus (2003 Finus ( , 2008 (2) Internal Stability:
External Stability:
denoting S the set of coalition members and where we assume for convenience that in case a non-signatory is indifferent between joining and staying outside the coalition he will join. In some parts of the analysis it will be helpful to work with the stability function introduced by Hoel and Schneider (1997) 
noticing that i ( n ) 0 Φ ≥ means internal stability and i ( n 1) 0 Φ + < external stability.
In other words, if coalition n is internally stable, then coalition n 1 − is externally unstable and if coalition n is externally stable, then coalition n 1 + is internally unstable.
In case we consider ancillary benefits, payoff function (1) becomes:
Thus, the parameter α measures the weight which ancillary benefits receive in the payoff function of countries. These additional benefits only depend on the abatement conducted in this country. For simplicity, we assume the same functional form for 5 This assumption has been made frequently in the literature though it is certainly a simplification. See for instance Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) .
benefits from global abatement and ancillary benefits. The coalition game is solved in exactly the same way. However, payoffs will depend on α and hence we write
( n, ) π α , respectively. Also stability is defined in the same way, accounting for the different notation, e.g.
Subsequently, we consider specific benefit and cost functions that have been frequently used in the literature as analytical results for general payoff functions cannot be derived.
Model with Linear Benefit and Cost Functions
No Ancillary Benefits
The simplest payoff function assumes linear benefit and cost functions, which may almost be regarded as a toy model, though it has gained a lot of popularity in the recent literature (e.g. Barrett (2003) , Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007) ). The reasonapart from its simplicity -is that this model version allows generating every stable coalition size which can be related to the benefit-cost ratio from abatement.
Consider the following payoff function where b is a benefit and c a cost parameter: Suppose now one player leaves the coalition with n signatories such that n 1 − signatories are left. Consider first the possibility that signatories continue to abate (though the free-rider will no abate as this is the equilibrium choice as a singleton).
Then the free-rider would receive a payoff of
γ > which we ruled out by assumption 2 in (7). Consider now the second possibility that signatories switch from abatement to no abatement once a signatory leaves and hence
In other words, * n is the largest integer of the relation 1 / γ , i.e.
For any * n n > , signatories would continue to abate after one signatory has left their coalition, which cannot be an equilibrium as argued above. For any * n n < signatories would not abate in the first place (as abatement is not profitable) and hence no coalition would form. It is easily checked that * n is also the only coalition which is externally stable and hence stable. Thus, in this model there is a strong threshold effect.
The lower the benefit-cost ratio γ , the larger will be the threshold effect and hence
Total payoff in the coalition equilibrium is given by
comparison later, we measure the performance of this equilibrium in relative terms, which we call "closing the gap index " (Eyckmans and Finus (2006) ) and define as follows:
with 1 CGI 0 ≥ ≥ . For the model above, we find:
Thus, anything else being equal, the closing the gap index decreases with the number of players involved in the externality problem -a result reflecting the public good nature of the global environmental problem and well-known from other models.
Ancillary Benefits
Consider (11) with (17), it is obvious that ancillary benefits cannot improve, but can only worsen the situation. As we will see, this negative conclusion will not change much in the subsequent models.
Model with Linear Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions
No Ancillary Benefits
Consider the following payoff function which has been considered for instance in Botteon and Carraro (1997) , Barrett (2006) and Finus and Maus (2008) 
Ancillary Benefits
Modifying payoff function (18)# to account for ancillary benefits gives: . Roughly speaking, all rela-tions just change by the factor α . The drop in benefits (benefits from global abatement and ancillary benefits) and the drop in abatement costs when leaving a coalition become larger, but by the same factor. Hence, stability is not affected. The same applies when computing relative performance. Consequently, compared to the previous model, ancillary benefits have at least not a negative effect, but the conclusion is also not brighter.
Model with Quadratic Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions
Consider the following payoff function:
This payoff function is essentially the same as in Barrett (1994) , Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) , though they assume 0 α = .
6 In order to save space, we derive in this section the case without and with ancillary benefits together, noticing from the previous analysis that no ancillary benefits is a special case of ancillary benefits when setting 0. α = Since this model is far more messy in terms of derivations than the previous models, we sketch here only the main arguments of the analysis and relegate the details to the appendix.
The first thing to notice is that -inserting equilibrium abatement levels into the marginal benefit function from global abatement, marginal benefits could become negative. This is equivalent to saying that total abatement in the social optimum could 6 Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) specify their model in terms of emissions but the incentive structure remains the same as long as non-negativity constraints are observed (which we do) as this authors prove. However, different from these authors we do not assume Stackelberg leadership of signatories to be consistent with the previous models where Stackelberg leadership would make no difference due to dominant strategies. See Finus (2003) .
be smaller than in the Nash equilibrium if the weight α which ancillary benefits receive is sufficiently large. In the appendix we show that a sufficient condition to rule this out and to ensure reasonable results, is:
(23) Ass. 5:
In a next step we analyze the stability function, which we write
with Γ a set of parameters, comprising α , conclude that there cannot be a stable coalition larger than 2. This finding is well known and probably goes back to Carraro and Siniscalco (1991) . The new and interesting part is that this also holds for ancillary benefits for any α defined in the range in (23).
In a next step, we set 0 α = and n 2 = in the stability function but make no further assumptions, i.e. Taken together for this model the effect of ancillary benefits is mixed, though also not very encouraging. First of all, ancillary benefits cannot expand the coalition to more than 2 signatories which is the upper limit without ancillary benefits. Second, for the parameter range of the benefit-cost parameter γ for which a coalition of two signatories is stable without ancillary benefits, an increasing weight α of ancillary benefits has a negative impact on the relative performance measured as the closing the gap index. Third, in a few instances, ancillary benefits can expand the range of the benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition is stable. This expansion is negligible if the total number of players is sufficiently large.
Summary and Conclusions
Ancillary benefits have attracted much attention in climate change research and are regularly found to be of significant size. The IPCC (2007: 623) stresses the importance of ancillary benefits in the design of air pollution reduction and energy security policy and the rise in rural employment. The "efficiency-raising impact" of an inclusion of ancillary benefits in cost-benefit analyses has been highlighted recurrently.
Estimated efficient climate protection levels tend to rise considerably due to the inclusion of ancillary benefits.
However, what was largely omitted in the scientific literature is the analysis of the strategic implications of the privatizing effect of ancillary benefits. Intuitively, one would expect that taking account of ancillary benefits will alleviate free-rider incentives and hence will raise the attractiveness of participation in international agreements to slow climate change.
In our paper, we focused on the strategic implications of ancillary benefits. We analysed the impacts of ancillary benefits in the strategic setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. Our results were counter-intuitive -at least at first thought. We found that ancillary benefits have a neutral or negative impact on the size of stable coalitions the success of coalition formation measured in welfare terms. Only in the model with quadratic benefit and quadratic cost functions could ancillary benefits expand the range of the benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition can be stable, though this occurs only in a few instances. However even then the expansion was insignificant if the total number of players is sufficiently large.
The conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that although ancillary benefits provide additional incentives to protect the climate, they will not raise the likelihood of an efficient global agreement on climate change to come about.
The intuition behind this result is that countries taking the private ancillary benefits to a greater extent into account will provide more climate policy, irrespective of an international agreement. The relative importance of an international agreement for climate protection is reduced since the privatizing effect of ancillary benefits already provides incentives for protection in a non-cooperative setting. Hence, though ancillary benefits provide an additional incentive to participate and to raise abatement contributions, they also provide an additional incentive to leave the agreement.
As outlined in the introduction, countries are enjoying different levels of ancillary benefits. In developing countries these seem to be more important than in industrialized countries. This heterogeneity should be included in future models. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that ancillary effects, like the mitigation of local air pollution, can also be produced by technologies (like desulphurisation installations) which do not produce climate protection. These technologies tend to reduce the level of ancillary benefits. Moreover, technological interdependencies should be explored in future research. Finally, there may also be ancillary cost, e.g. induced by a reduction in energy self-sufficiency, associated with certain climate policies. It would be interesting to see how these affect the outcome.
Appendix
For payoff function (22) in the text the first order condition of a non-signatory and signatory, respectively, are given by
where we denote total abatement of non-signatories by NM Q and of signatories by M Q with the understanding that total abatement is
Solving ( Hence, we have proved that also signatories' abatement is always positive.
In a next step we analyze the stability function Investigating the closing the gap index as defined in (10) in the text for n 2 = , we find (A17) We want to show that J 0 > and hence this derivative is negative. First we concentrate on I . We notice that I is concave in γ . Setting I 0 = and solving for γ gives two values of which only one is positive. This value, denoted by ( N ) ω γ , is given by
